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What Good is Abstraction? From Liberal 
Legitimacy to Social Justice 
NIMER SULTANY† 
INTRODUCTION 
The stakes could not be higher. Post-World War II 
political and economic institutions are under unprecedented 
pressure. The social coalitions that have sustained them are 
crumbling. Welfare-state capitalism is in retreat, and liberal 
institutions are besieged. Right-wing populists are 
cementing their power and consolidating their grip on 
political and legal institutions around the globe. In the 
United States, President Donald Trump’s judicial 
appointments, especially to the Supreme Court, are likely to 
secure the ideological hegemony of the extreme Right-wing 
for decades to come under the mantle of the rule of law. The 
answer to these historical changes cannot be a return to the 
very status quo that led to them in the first place. It cannot 
be argued that what preceded the Right-wing populist wave 
was a decent social order and well-functioning political 
system. Instead of seeking a renewal of failed liberal 
formulas that underpinned a broken political system, what 
is urgently required is a theoretical comprehension of these 
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new realities in order to change them and prevent their 
future iterations. The scale of these dramatic 
transformations should be matched by theoretical 
transformations. 
In order to have real purchase, political theory and legal 
theory need to provide adequate tools and frameworks for a 
critical response to historical conditions of human existence. 
The poverty of theory is an inadequate response to the 
increase in inequality and concentrated poverty in wealthy 
capitalist societies. This Article argues progressive liberal 
theoretical frameworks are unfit for purpose. They betray a 
loss of conviction and commitment to the very egalitarian 
ideals that progressive liberals advocate for. Specifically, this 
Article critiques abstraction as a mode of argumentation in 
political and legal theory in which there is a retreat from 
controversial political and moral territory to establish a 
consensual political regime and binding legal order. It is not 
a critique of abstraction—the unavoidable activity of 
generalizing knowledge and forming concepts (including in 
mathematics and art)—per se. Nor does it seek to engage in 
metaphysical debates about “nominalism,” as in whether 
abstract objects and universals exist. Rather, the method of 
abstraction is endemic to political theory in order to establish 
general conclusions and to “escape the tyranny of context.”1 
The critique zeros in on a specific form of abstraction given 
its rational failings and objectionable normative effects: 
namely, the kind of legal-political orders it justifies. It is an 
internal critique to liberal theory that illustrates that this 
abstraction does not meet the theory’s own standards and 
fails to achieve its declared objectives. This methodological 
critique of abstraction is tied to a substantive critique of a 
normatively objectionable standard of legitimacy to which 
this form of abstraction leads. 
The main family of theories that betray this lack of 
 
 1. Chandran Kukathas, Contextualism Reconsidered: Some Skeptical 
Reflections, 7 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 215, 221–22 (2004). 
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conviction is “political liberalism,” as developed by eminent 
scholars such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Political 
liberalism draws a clear distinction between the ambitions of 
liberal justice and the institutional commitments of liberal 
legitimacy. While both Rawls and Dworkin claim that 
advanced capitalist and liberal constitutionalist democracies 
are unjust by the standards their own theories of liberal 
justice stipulate, they still hold that these are nevertheless 
legitimate political regimes and political economies. The 
reason for this gap between liberal legitimacy and liberal 
justice is abstraction, or proceduralization, in which there is 
an attempt to narrow down disagreement to allow a 
convergence over an agreed upon general structure of a 
political regime amongst differently situated social actors. 
This leads to an increasing thinning out of the pre-conditions 
for the permissible exercise of coercive political power. 
Consequently, progressive liberals allow as legitimate 
policies and practices, such as welfare-state capitalism and 
neo-liberalism, that are detrimental to the very goals that 
they aspire to. Therefore, the egalitarian bark of progressive 
liberal theory is louder than its egalitarian bite. Ultimately, 
liberal legitimacy is not merely different from justice but it 
also defers justice and legitimates injustice. 
What is remarkable about all of this is that progressive 
liberals pay a heavy price (retreating from their egalitarian 
commitments) for something they cannot achieve (narrowing 
down disagreement to allow for a consensual mode of 
governance). The abandonment of progressive ambitions to 
the elusive tranquility of the center betrays an irrational 
hope because the center cannot hold: it is neither stable nor 
static. 
Another way to describe this family of political liberalism 
is that of “liberalism of fear.”2 This conception of liberalism 
 
 2. Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL 
LIFE 21 passim (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989). Rawls himself refers to Shklar’s 
article as part of the family of political liberalism. John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism: Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132, 133 n.1 (1995). 
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emphasizes the deep suspicion of the state and fear from the 
abuse of political power; it puts “cruelty and fanaticism at 
the very head of the human vices.”3 Judith Shklar seeks a 
freestanding liberalism that avoids unnecessary 
controversial intellectual territory.4 Thus, liberalism can be 
compatible with a wide range of traditions and religions.5 
This liberalism is exclusively oriented to the political 
sphere.6 Following Shklar, András Sajó conceptualizes 
liberal constitutionalism as a “constitutionalism of fear.”7 
But this fear of commitment to progressive ideals ends 
up producing that which is feared. For example, Rawls’ 
egalitarianism is evident in his rejection of laissez-faire 
capitalism (because it only guarantees formal equality with 
a low social minimum) and of welfare-state capitalism 
(because it allows the concentration of wealth and power in 
the hands of the few and creates a permanent welfare-
dependent underclass).8 Thus, Rawlsian justice requires the 
“fair value of political liberties” to prevent the corrupting 
influence of wealth on the political system, it requires 
egalitarianism that benefits the least advantaged in society, 
and it seeks guarantees against the formality of rights by 
requiring a fair equality of opportunity in access to positions 
and offices. Yet, Rawlsian legitimacy allows as legitimate a 
large part of that which liberal justice condemns because 
these are excluded from the “constitutional essentials.”9 
Liberal constitutionalism thereby abandons citizens to anti-
 
 3. Shklar, supra note 2, at 23; see also JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 
7–44 (1984). 
 4. Shklar, supra note 2, at 24. 
 5. Id. at 26. 
 6. Id. at 31. 
 7. ANDRÁS SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 115–133 (2011). For an earlier 
version of this argument, see ANDRÁS SAJÓ, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM (1999). 
 8. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 135–40 (Erin Kelly 
ed., 2001). 
 9. See discussion infra Part I. 
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egalitarian, neo-liberal policies such as deregulation, 
privatization, commodification, and taxation schemes that 
privilege the rich. This is an unjust political economy that 
distributes wealth upwards to the upper classes, creates 
huge disparities in wealth and power, impoverishes citizens 
and dislocates them, and destroys the social fabric in ways 
that make the citizenry amenable to the siren calls of false 
prophets.10 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I sketches 
political liberalism’s double-move in which prominent 
scholars like Rawls and Dworkin increasingly abstract from 
moral and political disagreement by proceduralizing moral 
and political conflict. This proceduralization leads to the 
thinning out of the basis for political authority and at the 
same time it imposes limits on the politics of progressive 
justice. Part II argues this argumentative move is futile and 
hence its consequences are not warranted. This is because 
the legitimacy standards that political liberals proffer 
(Rawls’ “constitutional essentials” and Dworkin’s “integrity”) 
are no less controversial than the substantive disagreements 
over justice they seek to circumvent. Using the example of 
the liberal commitment to neutrality in institutional design, 
Part II further illustrates that constraints on politics are 
controversial and contingent. Neutrality is incoherent 
because it mandates contradictory outcomes. Ultimately, it 
is either too thin to secure progressive objectives, or too thick 
to be consensual. Part III highlights the objectionable nature 
of this abstraction and responds to potential objections to the 
argument. It argues abstraction is not merely futile but also 
leads to objectionable consequences that undermine the very 
ambitions and prospects of liberal justice. 
I. THE DOUBLE-MOVE OF LIBERAL THEORY AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
A dominant approach in liberalism employs a two-fold 
 
 10. See generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEO-LIBERALISM (2005). 
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move: from the good to justice (since liberalism permits and 
encourages disagreement over the good and does not want to 
determine for citizens what ways of life they want to lead) 
and from justice to legitimacy (since liberal scholars realize 
disagreements over justice should also be taken seriously but 
nonetheless can be contained in normative conceptions of 
legitimacy). 
The purpose of this exercise is to show that, first, this 
theoretical justificatory movement leads to an increasing 
thinning out of the conception of the socio-political order; 
second, the alleged objective for this thinning out is 
circumventing disagreement in order to provide a solid basis 
for legal and political ordering; but, third, this objective fails 
in every step. The more disagreement is recognized, the 
thinner the conception of the political order becomes. The 
outcome of this process is a considerably thin political and 
legal ordering without an acceptable conception of legitimacy 
that can attract the necessary wide allegiance. Finally, this 
movement is detrimental for the kind of politics that may be 
pursued within the liberal political order. 
A. From the Good to Justice 
The ethical question of “the good life” is concerned with 
the particular pursuit of a way of life according to one’s 
ordering of values and one’s desired or preferred ends. 
Liberal “justice,” on the other hand, is concerned with the 
pursuit of norms or general moral rules that are right for 
everyone and can regulate people’s conduct as well as their 
interactions and relations with each other. The relation 
between the good life and liberal justice requires a 
consideration of the move from “comprehensive liberalism” 
(that presupposes a societal agreement over the good) to 
“political liberalism” (that presupposes an irreconcilable 
disagreement over the good). This move suggests the defense 
of liberal justice cannot be too liberal (and thus 
comprehensive). Rather, it should be defended on the basis 
of the thinnest justification possible (political liberalism). It 
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therefore becomes possible for it to be endorsed by a wide-
range of views and ways of life including non-liberal ones. 
1. Rawls: From Comprehensive Liberalism To Political 
Liberalism 
Rawls argues the liberal theory of justice as fairness is a 
“deontological theory.”11 Accordingly, and unlike 
“teleological theories”: “something is good if it fits into ways 
of life consistent with the principles of right already on 
hand.”12 The priority of justice over the good does not mean 
that a theory of justice is innocent of any ideas of the good in 
its justificatory exercise. Rather, Rawls distinguishes 
between the “thin” theory of the good and the “full” theory of 
the good. The principles of justice presuppose the thin 
theory, which seeks “to secure the premises about primary 
goods required to arrive at the principles of justice.”13 The 
primary goods are those goods that any rational person 
would like to maximize as a means to advance her specific 
ends regardless of her full conception of the good.14 Primary 
goods would include liberties, rights, income, and the social 
bases of self-respect.15 
Despite the thinness and universality of the “thin theory 
of the good,” Rawls’ is a “comprehensive theory” in A Theory 
of Justice. This theory is comprehensive both because “it 
appeals to moral values in addition to justice (full autonomy, 
the good of community)” and because “it invokes 
philosophical accounts of the nature of agency and of 
practical reason, of moral objectivity, moral justification, and 
moral truth.”16 It is this baggage that the move to “political 
 
 11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26 (23d prtg. 1999). 
 12. Id. at 396. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 62, 395–99. 
 15. Id. at 90–95. 
 16. SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 325 (2007). It is a matter of debate whether 
Rawls is correct in his assessment of his earlier work as being comprehensive or 
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liberalism” seeks to put aside since it makes the theory of 
justice more controversial than it should be and is required 
for justifying the political order. 
In Political Liberalism Rawls revises the relationship 
between the good and justice by distinguishing between 
“political” conceptions of justice and “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.”17 Now he claims that it is not 
enough for justice as fairness to be a deontological theory 
that prioritizes justice over the good. Justice should not be 
grounded in any controversial ethical foundations that might 
be rejected by reasonable comprehensive doctrines.18 In 
order to secure stability for the theory of justice it needs to 
be ethically “freestanding”—justified independently of any 
conception of the good—so it can be adhered to by a variety 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.19 The justification for 
the principles of justice that will regulate the well-ordered 
society should be cleansed from any metaphysical or ethical 
frameworks, specifically those that are not shared by the 
non-liberal and non-secular. It should neither affirm nor 
deny controversial ethical propositions.20 In other words, it 
needs to be “political” (or “procedural”): invokes political 
notions only, addresses the political domain (concerned with 
the “basic structure”—the primary political, social and 
economic institutions in society—as opposed to the 
“background culture” of civil society), and regulates political 
conflict. The grounds for this political justification are to be 
found in “latent” or “implicit” ideas in the already existing 
 
partially comprehensive. See, e.g., Roberto Alejandro, What is Political About 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 58 J. POLITICS 1, 15–16 (1996); Brian Barry, John 
Rawls and the Search for Stability, 105 ETHICS 874, 876–80 (1995). This 
discussion is beside the point for my concerns. The main objective is to show that 
Rawls makes certain theoretical moves given his own assessment of his own work 
and of liberalism’s possibility to gain normative acceptability in the political 
world. And that this movement increases the thinness of the theory. 
 17. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 10–15, 59–60 (expanded ed., 2005). 
 18. See Barry, supra note 16, at 890. 
 19. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 10, 12. 
 20. Id. at xix–xx. 
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“public political culture of a democratic society.”21 By 
clarifying “widely shared” ideas, Rawls hopes to avoid the 
deployment of a wide-ranging philosophical defense of these 
ideas.22 Comprehensive doctrines, on the other hand, reside 
in the background culture, “the culture of the social, not of 
the publicly political. It is the culture of daily life.”23 
The move to political liberalism creates a bifurcation in 
the justificatory edifice of liberalism between the citizen and 
the person in general: that is, between political public 
justifications deployed by (and addressed to) the citizen and 
comprehensive justifications deployed in the non-political 
sphere (background culture) and addressed to the individual 
in her non-political capacity.24 Whereas in comprehensive 
liberalism the main unit is the person in general, in political 
liberalism the main unit is the person’s capacity as a citizen; 
whereas comprehensive liberalism seeks full moral 
autonomy that refers to systems of values, political 
liberalism seeks a more limited grounding of political 
autonomy.25 This differentiation is a distinctively liberal 
position and by no means limited to Rawls.26 Political 
liberalism, then, involves a “division of the moral territory” 
between political theory and personal morality, and 
egalitarianism is required in the design of collective 
institutions but not as a matter of personal ethics and 
individual conduct.27 
Following this change, it would seem that justice is 
detached even further from the good. The foundational 
 
 21. Id. at 13, 175. 
 22. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 331–32. 
 23. Rawls, supra note 2, at 140. 
 24. RAWLS, supra note 17, at xxi (calling it “dualism”). 
 25. Id. at xlii–xliii, 29–35, and 99–101. 
 26. See, e.g., Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 351–
53 (1990). 
 27. Thomas Nagel, Rawls and Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
RAWLS 62, 82 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). 
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justification for justice now rests on narrower grounds. 
Rawls claims his earlier work invoked partially 
comprehensive ideas and it assumed that “in the well-
ordered society of justice as fairness, citizens hold the same 
comprehensive doctrine,” but these assumptions are now 
cast away.28 Thus, this version of liberalism claims to be 
more accommodationist of a variety of ways of life than 
comprehensive liberalism,29 for it claims to be sidestepping 
many ethical-moral questions.30 
2. Dworkin: From Comprehensive Liberalism To 
Political Liberalism 
Dworkin presents in Sovereign Virtue a self-declared 
ethical and comprehensive liberalism.31 Dworkin advocates 
a conception of the good society and the virtues it encourages 
among its citizens (such as leading imaginative lives or 
reflective judgment as in the “challenge model” and 
responsibility of members not to lead wasted lives).32 In this 
conception of justice, Dworkin obscures the line between 
ethics and political philosophy. This, some scholars have 
suggested, collapses the distinction between the right and 
the good and substitutes the deontological character of the 
theory for the ethical.33 Yet, it is more accurate to say that 
 
 28. RAWLS, supra note 17, at xl, 99–101. 
 29. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and Political 
Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2011) (endorsing political liberalism since it 
is “superior” to perfectionist liberalism, like the one advocated by Isaiah Berlin 
and Joseph Raz, which is a comprehensive doctrine). 
 30. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 360–61 
(1980). 
 31. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 4–5 (2000) [hereinafter DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE]. Dworkin 
presents a more systematized account in his book: RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS (2011) [hereinafter DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS]. 
 32. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 31, at 238–40. 
 33. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTION TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 63 (William Rehg trans., paperback 
ed. 1998); BERNARD WILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED: REALISM AND 
MORALISM IN POLITICAL ARGUMENT 10 n.5 (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 2005). 
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the theory is still deontological (the right is prior to the good) 
even though it is comprehensive (the right is grounded in and 
supported by the good, and the good of living well is supposed 
to be shared). Dworkin’s attempt to find an “ethical basis for 
morality” and “unite ethics and morality”34 neither 
relinquishes the universal character of morality nor follows 
classical teleological theories into embedding it in a specific 
social structure.35 That is, encouraging the virtue of living 
well is not meant to advance a particular conception of the 
good, nor is it necessarily to be maximized.36 
Dworkin’s attempt suggests, for the later Rawls, a 
comprehensive doctrine that cannot be a basis for coercive 
political and legal ordering under conditions of ethical 
disagreement.37 Indeed, Dworkin’s writings about the 
justification for coercive power in Law’s Empire present a 
decidedly political liberal view of justice. Here, justice 
becomes one ideal among other important ideals like 
fairness, integrity, and due process. Like Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism which idealizes fundamental ideas found in the 
tradition and practice of democracies in order to ground the 
theory of justice in acceptable roots, Dworkin looks at the 
history and practice of the community understood as a moral 
community of principle in order to distill the meaning of, and 
provide the foundations for, justice. Rather than grounding 
it in a comprehensive conception of a wide-ranging 
philosophical system—as he does in Sovereign Virtue as well 
as Justice for Hedgehogs—he grounds it in Law’s Empire 
within the community as an internal concept to the practice. 
Justice, Dworkin writes, “is an institution we 
interpret.”38 To discover the truth about justice, namely, 
 
 34. Ronald Dworkin, What is a Good Life?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 10, 2011, 
passim. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 211 n.42. 
 38. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 73 (1986). 
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what are the true statements or requirements of justice, one 
needs first to examine the existing “paradigms” (the 
competing historical practices and interpretations). In other 
words, one posits tentative assumptions in the pre-
interpretive stage and then makes judgments about what 
justice really is in the post-interpretive stages. One could 
arrive at the conclusion that some theories of justice are 
actually a “mistake”: they are not theories of justice at all. 
Accordingly, theories of justice that radically diverge from 
and challenge the contemporary paradigmatic 
understanding of justice, like Nietzsche’s or Marx’s, are 
examples of such mistakes.39 
Part of the constructive interpretive process is to 
delineate the independence and interdependence between 
one social practice (e.g., justice) and other social practices 
(e.g., law, fairness). In order to uncover the difference one 
asks what is the point of justice, fairness, or law and what 
interest or purpose do they serve. In addition, the 
requirements of the social practice are “sensitive to its point” 
and thus they “are not necessarily or exclusively what they 
have always been taken to be.” Therefore, we “impose 
meaning on the institution [of justice]—to see it in its best 
light—and then to restructure it in the light of that 
meaning.”40 
The broad lines of Dworkin’s political theory of 
interpretation can be stated in the following brief terms: the 
best interpretation of a community—as well as law—is one 
that is organized and guided by integrity in principle.41 The 
best interpretation of integrity is one of a single, coherent, 
principled common scheme of justice (as opposed to 
disparate, arbitrary, pragmatic, and inconsistent 
applications).42 The best interpretation of justice is neither 
 
 39. Id. at 75. 
 40. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original). 
 41. Id. at 214. 
 42. Id. at 178, 219. 
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based on majority sentiments nor on social conventions, 
rather, it centralizes equal respect and concern.43 The best 
interpretation of equality is that of equality of resources.44 
Elsewhere, Dworkin argues the political regime should 
be impartial towards the conceptions of the good held, or 
ways of life pursued, by the citizenry. This is a basic 
assumption of the liberal theory of equality, or liberalism’s 
“constitutive political morality,” in making political 
decisions.45 He also insists, like Rawls,46 that liberalism 
“does not rest on any special theory of personality.”47 
B. From Justice to Legitimacy 
It is within the political conception of liberal justice, 
rather than the ethical or comprehensive conception, that 
the contemporary liberal question of legitimacy is raised. 
And it is this conception that best represents the alleged 
break between Enlightenment liberalism and post-
Enlightenment liberalism, given the heightened awareness 
that reason does not lead to moral and political consensus.48 
Indeed, political authority—for many leading contemporary 
liberal scholars—is based neither on the good nor on justice 
but on legitimacy. 
1. Rawls 
A “political conception must be practicable,” it needs to 
“fall under the art of the possible.”49 There is no practical use 
for a political conception of justice if it is not stable. On the 
 
 43. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 214–20 (9th prtg. 2000). 
 44. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 297–98. 
 45. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 190–92. 
 46. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 26–27. 
 47. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 203. See also DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 440–
41. 
 48. See, e.g., GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM 1–22 
(2003). 
 49. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 185. 
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one hand, there is a range of just regimes but not all of them 
are stable. On the other hand, there is a range of stable 
regimes but not all of them are just. Thus, Rawls argues that 
stability needs to be for the “right reasons.” It is a quest for 
normative stability of just regimes (the regime would provide 
reasonable citizens with good reasons for compliance) rather 
than mere sociological acceptance. The mission of Political 
Liberalism is to theorize when this can be achieved. 
Previously, stability in A Theory of Justice is achieved 
because there is a consensus over justice as fairness as true. 
Not everyone, however, will accept Rawls’ own ethical, 
Kantian justification for his theory of justice in A Theory of 
Justice given the fact of reasonable pluralism (the existence 
of irreconcilable ethical differences) and the burdens of 
judgment (that reason leads to disagreement even amongst 
the reasonable). Not everyone who is reasonable is a liberal 
and not everyone who is reasonable will accept that moral 
autonomy is an intrinsic good.50 Furthermore, there is a 
disagreement even amongst liberals both on how liberal 
justice should be justified and what it requires (Kant and 
Mill, for instance). Hence for Political Liberalism, justice as 
fairness is merely one of several possible liberal political 
theories of justice, though arguably it is the most reasonable 
of them.51 For justice as fairness to be the most reasonable it 
should prove that it is the most stable theory of justice—this 
can be achieved by its political nature that guarantees the 
widest endorsement despite reasonable disagreement. 
Stability would be guaranteed for three reasons: the basic 
structure would be regulated by justice as fairness; there will 
be an “overlapping consensus” endorsing justice as fairness 
given its political nature; and “public reason” mirrors the 
political nature of the theory of justice in that public debates 
by officials, legislatures, voters, and judges concerning 
fundamental questions of justice would invoke political 
 
 50. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 319–22. 
 51. RAWLS, supra note 17, at xlvi–xlvii, 226–27. 
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terms and reasons.52 
The emphasis in political liberalism, then, moves from 
the “true” to the “reasonable.”53 The required consent for 
Rawls, however, is hypothetical rather than actual. Rawls is 
concerned with a theory of normative legitimacy as opposed 
to a sociological Weberian conception of legitimacy.54 Rawls, 
not unlike other scholars like Habermas, rejects Weberian 
legitimacy.55 The latter is an empiricist theory assessing 
sociological acceptance, while theories developed by Rawls 
and Habermas are reconstructive theories assessing the 
acceptability of the legal and political order by virtue of “good 
reasons” that are derived from “hypothetical contract” or 
“ideal speech” situations. Whereas the organizing concept for 
Weberian theory is belief, Rawls and Habermas prioritize 
reason. Weber’s legitimation question is how acceptance 
happens and why the regime is held to be legitimate, Rawls 
and Habermas ask how the regime can be acceptable (what 
conditions it needs to meet to be acceptable).56 
Accordingly, the theory stipulates the conditions under 
which the exercise of coercive power is legitimate 
(acceptable; morally justifiable) even though some citizens 
might consider this exercise unjust.57 According to the 
 
 52. Id. at 44. 
 53. Id. at xx; JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 17, at 441 passim. 
 54. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 31–38, 212–15 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim 
Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968). 
 55. For Habermas’ discussion of Weber’s legitimation, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
LEGITIMATION CRISIS 95–102 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975). See HABERMAS, 
supra note 33, at 107, for a discussion of Habermas’ principle of legitimacy, or 
normative validity. 
 56. For a critique of the Weberian model of legitimacy, compare Alan Hyde, 
The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379 
passim, with David O. Friedrichs, The Concept of Legitimation and the Legal 
Order: A Response to Hyde’s Critique, 3 JUST. Q. 33 passim (1986). 
 57. Burton Dreben, On Rawls and Political Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 27, at 316, 317. 
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Rawlsian “liberal principle of legitimacy,” which “reflects the 
abiding moral heart of liberal thought”58: 
our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials 
of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and 
rational.59 
An individual would accept the coercion of a legitimate 
system if there is (a) universal reasonable and rational 
acceptability and (b) general compliance by fellow citizens, 
(c) so long as the system is not too unjust.60 There are five 
important points here. 
First, the content of the theory of justice to which the 
“constitutional essentials” should conform does not change. 
The principles of justice and the lexical ordering (the priority 
of the political liberties over equality) between them is the 
same in both books. The main change is in the form of 
justification and the account of stability it gives rise to. 
Rawls claims that this means the same egalitarianism is 
preserved in the move from comprehensive to political 
liberalism.61 
Second, for reasonable citizens, the idea of legitimacy is 
directed at the general structure of political authority (as 
represented by the constitution) and not at specific laws 
since they know that unanimity is impossible.62 Thus, so long 
as statutes are enacted by a legitimate regime (that abides 
by the “constitutional essentials” according to some 
interpretation of these essentials that falls within the 
 
 58. Charles Larmore, The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism, 96 J. PHIL. 599, 
605–06 (1999). 
 59. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 217. See id. at 137, for a slightly different 
formulation. See also Rawls, supra note 2, at 148. 
 60. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and 
Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 27, at 
394 passim. 
 61. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 6–7. 
 62. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 488; Rawls, supra note 2, at 148. 
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bounds of the publicly reasonable), they are legitimate even 
if they are considered by some to be unjust.63 
Third, legitimacy “is a weaker idea than justice and 
imposes weaker constraints on [authority and on] what can 
be done. It is also institutional, though there is of course an 
essential connection with justice.”64 Yet, even if the 
constitution is legitimate, there might be situations in which 
the injustice of the outcomes is so grave that the constitution 
ceases to be legitimate. In these cases, the society is no longer 
a “well-ordered society” (a fair system of cooperation between 
free and equal citizens): 
But before this point is reached, the outcomes of a legitimate 
[democratic] procedure are legitimate whatever they are. This gives 
us purely procedural democratic legitimacy and distinguishes it 
from justice, even granting that justice is not specified procedurally. 
Legitimacy allows for an indeterminate range of injustice that 
justice does not.65 
 Fourth, it follows that there is a gap between legitimacy 
and justice. Reasonable people recognize they can achieve 
neither a perfectly just political ordering nor unanimity. 
These are two different reasons. In A Theory of Justice, 
Rawls invokes mainly the first and in Political Liberalism, 
he emphasizes the second. As for the question of 
disagreement: when citizens devise the general structure of 
political authority, they will not insist on including all the 
principles of justice but will agree, each one from her own 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine (thus forming an 
“overlapping consensus”), on a list of “constitutional 
essentials,” that is, a bill of political rights with a social 
 
 63. For a similar focus on the regime-level rather than the statute, see Frank 
I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (2003). However, Michelman’s view is more expansive 
than Rawls’ since it takes into account not merely the constitution but the totality 
of the regime (which means that it includes, inter alia, prevalent constitutional 
interpretations practiced in the state). 
 64. Rawls, supra note 2, at 175. 
 65. Id. at 176. 
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minimum. Hence, so long as the constitution is “sufficiently 
just” or “reasonably just” or “just enough” in “view of the 
circumstances and social conditions,” then the general 
structure of the political regime is legitimate.66 And so long 
as laws are enacted and decisions are decided in accordance 
with this reasonably just constitution—the procedures and 
conditions it sets forth—they are legitimate laws and 
decisions. 
Concretely, the second principle of justice (which 
includes both the fair equality of opportunity and the 
difference principle) will not make it to this list of 
“constitutional essentials.” The importance of the effect of 
this exclusion on Rawlsian theory cannot be overestimated. 
After all, the second principle of justice “marks the difference 
between laissez-faire capitalism and welfare state 
liberalism” as it “expresses the recognition that class 
stratification and the resulting inequality of chances in life 
are social evils bearing on the justice of a society.”67 Rawls 
says the egalitarianism of his theory rests on three pillars: 
the difference principle (social and economic inequality is 
justified if it works to the greatest benefit of the worst off 
amongst members of society; this can be institutionally 
expressed through income and property taxation as well as 
economic and fiscal policies), the fair equality of opportunity 
principle (which would ensure equal access to all offices and 
positions), and the fair value of political liberties within the 
first principle of justice (which would ensure that disparities 
in wealth do not distort the political process and the equal 
enjoyment and exercise of political liberties whether in terms 
of holding public offices or influencing political decisions). 
The last two ensure that rights are not “purely formal.”68 
Thus, the fair equality of opportunity 
requires (in addition to formal equality of opportunity or non-
 
 66. Id. at 175. 
 67. Nagel, supra note 27, at 68. 
 68. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 6–7. 
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discrimination on grounds of race, gender, religion, etc.) equal 
educational opportunities, a right to basic health care for all 
citizens, and governments’ limitations of concentrations of wealth 
when they tend to undermine fair equal opportunities.69 
Only the fair value of political liberties is part of the 
“constitutional essentials.”70 Thus, the principles that seek 
to prevent morally-arbitrary and undeserved social 
inequalities are sacrificed. 
Consequently, Rawls’ assertion that his theoretical move 
does not undermine his egalitarianism is not compelling. The 
reasons he invokes to justify this sacrifice are essentially 
appeals to the virtues of moderation and pragmatism. 
Reasonable people, he maintains, will give up the second 
principle given their “political wisdom”;71 the suspension of 
their passions, sentiments, and intensity of desires;72 their 
recognition of the “wide differences of reasonable opinion” in 
such questions (especially given the difficulty to monitor 
their realization);73 their ultimate recognition of the lesser 
urgency and significance of socio-economic rights;74 and that 
expanding the list of basic liberties to more than the “truly 
essential” will “risk weakening the protection of the most 
essential ones” and thus would undermine the “priority of 
liberty” (which refuses to sacrifice basic liberties for the 
purpose of economic improvement).75 
Given the failure to include all the principles of justice in 
the basic structure, for Rawls there is a considerable gap 
between justice and legitimacy. The gap is not merely a 
natural outcome of the fact of imperfection in human life, but 
also necessary given the fact of reasonable pluralism. That 
 
 69. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 469–70. 
 70. See Michelman, supra note 60, at 406. 
 71. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 156. 
 72. Id. at 190. 
 73. Id. at 229–30. 
 74. Id. at 230, 367. 
 75. Id. at 296. 
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is, Political Liberalism increases the gap between the 
demands of liberal justice for the well-ordered society, as 
advocated in A Theory of Justice, and the exercise of coercive 
power in the well-ordered society.76 The exercise of political 
power need not await the complete adoption of liberal justice. 
A welfare capitalist state is for Rawls an unjust state, yet it 
is a legitimate deployment of political power.77 Concretely, 
consider the example of basic health care for all citizens. For 
Rawls, this a requirement of justice.78 But its absence does 
not impact the legitimacy of the regime. The existence of 
millions of United States citizens without health care is 
unjust, but a political regime that enables these conditions is 
legitimate.79 
Fifth, the stability of political liberalism will be 
guaranteed by the “overlapping consensus” of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. Each reasonable and rational 
citizen from her own conception of the good and for her own 
reasons will come to accept and endorse the principles of 
justice. It is the fact that comprehensive doctrines and their 
adherents are reasonable that makes them converge over the 
principles of justice. They internalize the political conception 
of justice as part of their conception of the good.80 If a 
majority of the citizens comprise this consensus, then the 
political conception of justice will be stable, otherwise it will 
not. Those who do not endorse it are simply unreasonable 
 
 76. WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 1. 
 77. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 395. 
 78. RAWLS, supra note 17, at lvi–lvii. 
 79. See, e.g., Lisa Girion, Ranks of Uninsured in U.S. Shrank in ‘07, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2007), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-aug-27-fi-
census27-story.html; Jessica Glenza, Number of Uninsured Americans Increases 
by 7m in Four Years, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/23/healthcare-us-
americans-uninsured-2014-gallup. 
 80. Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just 
Democratic Constitution, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 627 (1994). 
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that should be coerced by the law.81 
2. Dworkin 
Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, which is concerned with 
justifying the coercive power of legal ordering, makes a 
similar move.82 There he acknowledges a gap between the 
“true community” (that treats its members with equal 
concern and respect) and the just community. Although the 
moral community or the “community of principle” (a 
community constituted by integrity since its members 
recognize that they are governed by common principles) is a 
true community, it is not necessarily just. Indeed, “[a]n 
association of principle is not automatically a just 
community; its conception of equal concern may be defective 
or it may violate the rights of its citizens or citizens of other 
nations . . . .”83 
This gap is a result of the fact that there are different 
desirable ideals and virtues (justice, fairness, due process, 
integrity) that are at play and might be the subject of 
disagreement in law and politics. Fairness and justice do not 
collapse into each other: “fair institutions sometimes produce 
unjust decisions and unfair institutions just ones.”84 
Integrity is needed to express a single, coherent scheme of 
principle in which these ideals are ranked properly when 
disagreement occurs.85 The need for integrity arises precisely 
because a perfectly-just society is beyond reach. Indeed, in 
such a society, integrity would be redundant.86 Under 
conditions of pluralism—in which citizens disagree over 
 
 81. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 489; Dreben, supra note 57, at 329. 
 82. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 190. 
 83. Id. at 213. 
 84. Id. at 177. 
 85. Id. at 178, 219, 404. 
 86. Id. at 176. See also id. at 165, 216; RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY 
POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 95 (2006) (arguing that 
legitimacy does not need to be perfectly just). 
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justice, fairness and political morality—a “community of 
principle” is as a “true community” as any community can 
get.87 Different people may have different theories of justice. 
Indeed, Dworkin himself has his own theory. But the 
question of law’s legitimacy is concerned with the 
deployment of coercive power and cannot rely on a subjective 
and non-consensual theory of justice.88 In a utopian world, 
citizens might agree on the same principles of justice like 
Dworkin’s or Rawls’. Rawlsian principles of justice, however, 
do not regulate the ordinary world of politics (not everyone 
agrees to these principles) and have no bearing on the 
question of legitimacy.89 In addition, obligations of justice are 
“conceptually universalistic” and do not explain obligations 
to specific communities under historical conditions. Thus 
legitimacy cannot be grounded in justice. Integrity, rather 
than justice, is the “parent” of legitimacy.90 A state is morally 
justified, and hence legitimate, if it endorses integrity and 
then it gives rise to a general obligation to obey the law.91 
Legitimacy requires integrity in legislation, adjudication, 
and in the moral community at large.92 
Like Rawls, legitimacy for Dworkin is a normative rather 
than a sociological notion. And it is concerned with the 
general structure of political ordering: “Political obligation 
is . . . not just a matter of obeying the discrete political 
decisions of the community one by one;” rather it is “a more 
protestant idea: fidelity to a scheme of principle[s].”93 
Like Rawls, Dworkin thinks that the legitimate political 
regime is the reasonably just one.94 In Taking Rights 
 
 87. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 214; see also id. at 411. 
 88. Id. at 97. 
 89. Id. at 192. 
 90. Id. at 193. 
 91. Id. at 191, 214–15. 
 92. Id. at 166. 
 93. Id. at 190. 
 94. This view is by no means limited to Rawls and Dworkin. Other liberal 
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Seriously he writes: 
The constitution sets out a general political scheme that is 
sufficiently just to be taken as settled for reasons of fairness. 
Citizens take the benefit of living in a society whose institutions are 
arranged and governed in accordance with that scheme, and they 
must take the burdens as well, at least until a new scheme is put 
into force either by discrete amendment or general revolution.95 
Thus, there is a range of permissible injustice. But, like 
Rawls, it should not be too unjust. While Dworkin thinks 
unjust decisions can be interpreted as mistakes from the 
standpoint of integrity, they should not be too unjust. If the 
unjust practice or institution is gravely and pervasively 
unjust then it cannot be redeemed, as it were, interpretively 
through a constructive method and it “should . . . be 
abandoned.”96 
C. Restricting Politics by Legitimacy 
The picture is complicated by the fact that the move from 
the good to the just involves a restriction of the good by the 
just, and the move from justice to legitimacy involves a 
restriction of demands made on behalf of justice by 
legitimacy conditions. These conditions impose structural, 
moral constraints on politics.97 These restrictions apply not 
only to politics that violates the principles of justice, but also 
politics that seeks to advance justice. They might not be 
restricted in similar ways, but the restriction goes both ways. 
The legitimacy conditions are justified in imposing such 
constraints given their non-controversial, public character. 
 
authors have invoked the idea of a reasonably just regime in different ways. See, 
e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1792 (2005). 
 95. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106 (4th prtg. 1978). 
 96. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 203–04. 
 97. WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 2 (discussing models of political theory, of 
which Rawls and Dworkin are primary examples, that prioritize the moral over 
the political and thus political theory becomes “applied morality”). 
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1. Rawls 
The Rawlsian “priority of liberty,” which prioritizes basic 
liberties over social justice, is “the true core of liberalism.”98 
According to this priority: “justice draws the limit,” while 
“the good shows the point.”99 That is, “admissible ideas of the 
good” can be sustained in an established framework of the 
political conception of justice as fairness. Consequently, one 
does not only ascend from the particular, subjective, and 
controversial to the general, universal, and impartial, but 
also one is confined by this move. One moves from the good 
to the just but then the just comes back to supervise the good. 
Individuals in society have rights that would protect them 
not only from unreasonable conceptions of the good that 
others may pursue, but also from mobilizing the coercive 
power of the state to advance reasonable conceptions of the 
good that they do not adhere to. Specifically, justice 
constrains majoritarian considerations of welfare and 
utilitarian calculus.100 However, justice does not always 
constrain the good. The principles of justice that Rawls calls 
“matters of basic justice” (these include the difference 
principle and fair equality of opportunity) do not constrain 
the good in the same way the equal basic liberties do because 
they are not considered part of the “constitutional 
essentials.”101 
This distinction between “constitutional essentials” and 
“matters of basic justice” requires a consideration of the 
constraints imposed on justice by legitimacy. There are two 
interrelated ways in which the constraints are manifested: 
the first is synchronic and the second is diachronic. The 
synchronic is concerned with what cannot be done in the here 
and the now. Here, the move from justice to legitimacy 
 
 98. Nagel, supra note 27, at 66–67. 
 99. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 174; John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas 
of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 252 (1988). 
 100. RAWLS, supra note 11, at 3. See also DWORKIN, supra note 95, at xi. 
 101. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 228–29. 
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means that legitimacy does not include all the principles of 
justice and thus justice constrains the good only insofar it is 
part and parcel of the conditions of legitimacy. That does not 
mean that one cannot criticize existing arrangements and 
policies from the perspective of justice. Yet all demands in 
the name of the just or the good should be raised within the 
legitimate structure and such demands do not necessarily 
have the coercive power of the law on their side. They might 
even be barred from mobilizing state law under conditions of 
reasonable disagreement by deploying rights to constrain 
democratic will. If there is no consensus in society over 
measures to advance the difference principle or the fair 
equality of opportunity, these measures can be hindered by 
the deployment of individual rights. What underlies the 
acceptance of such conditions as legitimate seems to be the 
following logic: Once the political community secures the 
first Rawlsian principle of justice (which includes the 
negative liberties, the social minimum, and the fair value of 
political liberties), it will not risk anarchy and insecurity for 
the sake of the difference principle and fair equality of 
opportunity. In other words, legitimacy confines justice. 
It is misleading for Rawls to stipulate that “justice draws 
the limit” in the priority of liberty. It is more accurate to say, 
within the Rawlsian framework, “legitimacy draws the 
limit.” In effect, legitimacy constrains both justice and the 
good. The importance of this qualification is to make clear 
that fewer constraints than initially proclaimed by theory 
are imposed on the good, given the gap between justice and 
legitimacy, and thus more injustice passes muster. Justice 
limits the good only partially (to the extent that some of its 
principles became part and parcel of the conditions of 
legitimacy). 
One way to understand this limitation is to see how the 
advancement of substantive demands that are required by 
justice is restricted by procedural requirements of 
legitimacy. It is insufficient for legislative or judicial 
pronouncements to be substantively just, they need also to 
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respect accepted democratic procedures and practices. 
Officials and judges cannot impose the difference principle or 
health care, for example, on an unwilling populace or 
legislature.102 Thus, contra Tushnet, a Rawlsian judge 
cannot use the difference principle in order to advance the 
cause of socialism.103 Moreover, Rawls makes clear that the 
difference principle is not a proper justification for civil 
disobedience because regime compliance with it is “more 
difficult to ascertain”, and citizens disagree about “economic 
and social institutions and policies.”104 
The second sense of constraint by legitimacy on justice is 
historical or diachronic. Rawls adopts a four-stage sequence 
that is neither actual nor purely theoretical. The first stage 
is the original position in which the principles of justice are 
chosen. The second stage is a convention in which the 
constitution is established. The third stage is the legislative 
assembly in which the legislators enact laws. The fourth 
stage is the judicial stage in which judges interpret the 
laws.105 Here, Rawls says that once we discover that we have 
established an imperfect constitution, we embark upon a 
project of political reform to correct the imperfections in 
order to achieve a more just society. The continuous project 
of reform is limited, however, in two ways. First, it is limited 
in terms of the subject because it is confined to the reflective 
judgments of the reasonable and not the rational, and the 
reasonable will be confined by the idea of “public reason” and 
its companion idea of “civility” and the requirement to appeal 
only “to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of 
reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and 
conclusions of science when these are not controversial.” 
Secondly, it is limited in terms of the object of reformist 
 
 102. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 206, 235, 378, 394; RAWLS, supra note 11, at 
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reflection because the principles of justice are “fixed.” Rawls 
writes: “we cannot change them to suit our rational interests 
and knowledge of circumstances as we please.”106 
Rawls argues the political autonomy of citizens is 
preserved both because they live under a sufficiently just 
constitution and because they have the ability to reform it. 
Rawls offers here a distinction between founders, who create 
the political structure, and revisers, who are born into these 
structures. Founders establish a constitution and the 
revisers materialize their political autonomy through a 
continuous process of correcting the imperfections. The fact 
that revisers are born into a constitutional structure, with 
“wisdom” and institutions inherited from the founders, does 
not undermine—Rawls asserts—their full political 
autonomy. Rawls uses an analogy to Kant’s writings in order 
to support his claim that the revisers’ political autonomy is 
not encroached upon. Reading Kant’s writings, Rawls 
argues, does not deprive us from reaching moral insights: 
“Why is understanding the justice of the constitution any 
different?”107 Surely this is a weak analogy. Revisers are 
born into the constitutional structure but the reader is not 
born into Kant’s writings. One can read Kant or not, can 
understand him or not, be influenced by him or not, but one 
cannot avoid encountering social and political structures. 
Additionally, citizens are not implicated in constructing and 
reproducing Kant’s ideas in the same way they are in socio-
political structures. The question becomes not merely one of 
possessing the intellectual ability to envisage necessary 
revisions, but also the potential for the development of 
political forces that would make these revisions a reality. 
This potential is shaped by the extant structures, because 
the “sufficiently just” constitution sanctions social injustice 
and thus unevenly empowers different groups in society. 
 
 106. Rawls, supra note 2, at 153. 
 107. Id. at 156. 
850 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
2. Dworkin 
Dworkinian integrity (being the basis of legitimacy that 
it is) constrains justice. Although integrity is not necessarily 
the last word in terms of action,108 and it is not always the 
case that justice is defeated when confronted by integrity,109 
the latter does impose meaningful constraints. Accordingly, 
under the community of principle, citizens have a 
responsibility to respect the “principles of fairness and 
justice instinct in the standing political arrangement” even 
if these are not the best principles when compared to other 
communities or judged from a utopian vantage point.110 This 
community “commands that no one be left out, that we are 
all in politics together for better or for worse, that no one may 
be sacrificed, like wounded left on the battlefield, to the 
crusade for justice overall.”111 This statement implies that 
one might need to accommodate injustice and those who 
represent it and defend it in the name of integrity.112 
In addition, the judge—including Hercules, the judge 
with infinite resources and time—is constrained by integrity 
and history. Although a proponent of Dworkinian equality of 
resources as he might be, he has to settle for less and cannot 
impose 
economic and redistributive programs that equality of resources 
demands. Nor, given the various constraints he accepts about how 
far he is free to read statutes to promote his view of justice, can he 
read into welfare and taxation schemes provisions equality of 
resources would approve.113 
Indeed, Dworkin insists that he himself does not 
read the Constitution to contain all the important principles of 
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political liberalism. In other writings, for example, I defend a theory 
of economic justice that would require a substantial redistribution 
of wealth in rich political societies. . . . I have insisted that integrity 
would bar any attempt to argue from the abstract moral clauses of 
the Bill of Rights, or from any other part of the Constitution, to any 
such result.114 
One may contest the idea that integrity or the legal materials 
(such as precedent) or history can considerably constrain the 
judge in interpreting and applying the constitution. But the 
main point here is that within Dworkin’s theoretical 
framework, he understands himself and his judges to be 
constrained in the domain of legitimacy in ways that the 
discussion within the domain of justice is not similarly 
constrained. 
D. Conclusion: The Career of Thinning Out 
Doubtless, given the complexity and wealth of the ideas 
of the scholars discussed here, a comprehensive reading of 
their entire corpus cannot be offered here. Nevertheless, this 
theoretical engagement with some core concepts captures the 
broad lines of the general moves performed by leading 
progressive liberal scholars and its effect on the overall 
movement of liberal egalitarianism. Here is a summary of 
some of the highlights of this story of the movement of liberal 
thought: 
First, the good life is too thick and particular and hence 
too controversial and unsuitable to serve as a solid 
foundation upon which the political-legal order can be 
erected. Therefore, there is a need for a thinner basis. But it 
cannot be too thin since it should be recognizably liberal. 
Justice is such a basis. (This is the move from the good to 
justice). 
Second, the defense of justice as the foundation for the 
liberal order cannot be too liberal (comprehensive), rather it 
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should be defended on the thinnest basis possible (political 
liberalism). Otherwise, it will not be acceptable to a wide-
range of views and ways of life. It should address individuals 
in their role as citizens only. (This is the move from 
comprehensive to political liberalism within the move from 
the good to justice). 
Third, justice is controversial. Even progressive liberal 
scholars cannot agree on what liberal justice requires. It 
cannot be assumed even under favorable conditions that 
justice will have one and only one universally accepted 
interpretation. Therefore, there is a need for a thinner 
ground for the political order to secure agreement and hence 
a solid foundation. But it cannot be too thin because it will 
be no more than sociological acceptance. For it to be liberal, 
it needs to contain the minimal conditions of liberal justice 
that seem to be less controversial. (This is the move from 
justice to legitimacy). 
Fourth, egalitarian distributive justice is not necessarily 
influenced by the second move (from the comprehensive to 
the political) but is influenced by the third move (from justice 
to legitimacy) since it creates a gap between justice and 
legitimacy and this gap justifies restrictions on the ways in 
which liberal justice can be advanced and demanded. 
It is not suggested here that this process of thinning out 
is an inherent characteristic of liberal theory, or that this is 
the only defensible way of reading liberal theory. The main 
contention here is that the moves described above have been 
characteristic of contemporary liberal egalitarian theory as 
its leading scholars have developed it. This interpretation of 
these moves shows a liberal process of thinning out. The 
warrant for this thinning out is to narrow down 
disagreement. But do these moves achieve this goal? The 
following maintains that they do not. 
II. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF LIBERAL LEGITIMACY 
In a double-move, liberal scholars travel from the good to 
justice and then from justice to legitimacy, that is, from thick 
2019] WHAT GOOD IS ABSTRACTION? 853 
conceptions for regulating social and political life to thinner 
conceptions, from the particular to the universal. 
Supposedly, this move allows these scholars to avoid 
disagreement that is evident in the pursuit of the good life 
but also recognized with respect to the principles of justice.115 
Liberal scholars do not argue that their theories will 
eradicate disagreement but that they will considerably 
reduce disagreement and therefore allow a convergence over 
an idea of legitimacy of the general structure of legal-political 
ordering.116 In turn, this arrival at solid foundations for 
regulating the political life of the community justifies 
restrictions on this political life. However, each step in this 
theoretical framework is controversial. It either presupposes 
a controversial substance when it claims to be proceduralist 
and universalist, or rests on indeterminate abstract 
concepts. The critique of this proceduralization is not merely 
that it contains substantive ideas but also that this 
substance (legitimacy standards) is controversial.117 In other 
words, the institutional framework for governance and 
conflict-resolution is no less contentious than the 
substantive-moral issues it seeks to circumvent. Moreover, 
the abstract concepts and principles this abstraction leads to 
do not exclusively dictate a particular form of social life. This 
is because they are compatible with competing institutional 
arrangements.118 
The purpose of what follows is to offer a brief account, by 
no means exhaustive, of some of the typical kinds of 
 
 115. Rawls calls his conception of political liberalism a “method of avoidance” 
because it avoids relying on controversial comprehensive doctrines. John Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 231 
(1985). 
 116. See RAWLS, supra note 17, at 28; RAWLS, supra note 8, at 151. 
 117. Proceduralism does not imply necessarily a lack of substance. RAWLS, 
supra note 17, at 192 (denying that his theory is procedurally neutral and 
acknowledging that his principles of justice are substantive). See also Joshua 
Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 589 passim (1994). 
 118. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97(6) 
HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1293 (1984). 
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disagreement that progressive liberal theoretical 
frameworks give rise to, even amongst the progressive 
liberals themselves. It is an account of the ways in which the 
declared purpose of deflecting disagreement is unceasingly 
undermined. Consequently, rather than containing 
disagreement, the method of abstraction generates more 
disagreement. The process of thinning out, therefore, is futile 
as it does not secure a universally acceptable standard for 
legitimacy. 
A. Disagreement All the Way Down 
While the focus here will be on the move from justice to 
legitimacy, the reasons for objecting for each kind of 
proceduralization (proceduralization of the question of the 
good by deflecting to justice and proceduralization of the 
question of justice by deflecting to legitimacy) are quite 
analogous.119 
Michelman’s critique of the proceduralist turn to 
legitimacy as an authoritative answer to disagreements 
establishes that disagreement cannot be papered over by any 
account of proceduralism and thus substantive judgments 
that lead to disagreement are inevitable.120 It is doubtful 
whether there can be a non-controversial public answer to 
the question of political authority and legal ordering to which 
either “everyone” or the “rational and the reasonable” would 
assent. A major reason for that is the abstraction of rules and 
principles. MacIntyre observes that these principles are 
abstract and empty since they do not “guide action” or, if they 
 
 119. For a critique of the detachment of justice from the good and for an 
argument that this very detachment breeds disagreement rather than narrows it 
down, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 39 (3d ed. 2007); Alasdair 
MacIntyre, The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture, 52 REV. POL. 344 
passim (1990). 
 120. Frank I. Michelman, The Not So Puzzling Persistence of the Futile Search: 
Tribe on Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA L. REV. 891 passim 
(2007). 
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are specific enough to guide action, controversial.121 
Similarly, Michelman points out that it is precisely the 
alleged proceduralist evasion of controversial substance by 
fleeing to abstraction (in order to provide grounds for 
legitimacy) that prevents constitutional legitimation of 
political acts (given its emptiness and indeterminate 
nature).122 Michelman concludes that legitimacy cannot be 
obtained once and for all but can only be approximated, and 
it is eventually subject to individual judgment in which all 
things are considered.123 
1. Legitimacy’s Contract: Rawlsian Constitutional 
Essentials 
Michelman’s critique of the centrality of the idea of the 
constitution to Rawlsian and Habermasian conceptions of 
legitimacy illustrates their weaknesses. This is because they 
seek to deflect judgments on the rightness of concrete 
political acts and legislative enactments to judgment on the 
regime’s overall legitimacy by virtue of its constitution’s 
conformity with acceptable constitutional rules (which 
express the fundamental terms of the political 
community).124 
The problem, however, with such constitution-based 
notions of legitimacy is that the normative constitution tells 
us very little about the reality of political authority. The hope 
that such a constitution will provide a “public” convergence 
or wide acceptance, notwithstanding intractable and deep 
disagreements, founders. The retreat to core and abstract 
universal notions that everyone could agree to will not 
 
 121. MacIntyre, supra note 119, at 349. 
 122. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for Political 
Acts, 66 MOD. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003). 
 123. See Frank I. Michelman, A Reply to Baker and Balkin, 39 TULSA L. REV. 
649 passim (2004); Frank I. Michelman, Reply to Ming-Sung Kuo, 7 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 715 passim (2009). 
 124. Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV. 
CONST. STUD. 101, 121 (2003). 
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guarantee such an acceptance. Rights guaranteed by 
constitutions are too abstract to inform citizens’ judgments 
regarding the regime’s overall legitimacy. In order to make 
such a judgment, one will have to include other 
considerations like the interpretations and applications of 
these rights and the institutions and practices put in place 
to interpret and apply them. To use Michelman’s phrase, one 
will have to consider the “governmental totality.” But to 
include such considerations would defeat the purpose of the 
constitutional contractual idea that requires abstracting 
from these controversial concrete practices. Furthermore, 
the fact that the constitution could have been interpreted and 
applied in other ways that would have been more congenial 
to one’s orientations is likely to be less material to one’s 
judgment of the political regime as it is practiced here and 
now under the constitution’s name.125 
The difficulties that Rawls faces are representative of 
the shortcomings of the contractual idea of legitimacy. 
Central to the Rawlsian liberal principle of legitimacy is the 
notion of “constitutional essentials” (which include the basic 
civil and political liberties and a social minimum). It is the 
conformity to these essentials that renders the regime 
legitimate. They serve as the yardstick for legitimacy. Yet 
this yardstick is vulnerable to four challenges: over-
inclusion, under-inclusion, inadequacy, and incoherence. 
First, over-inclusion 
Rights enumerated in the bill of rights are abstract and 
mean different things to different people at different times. 
It is precisely the detachment of these rights from their 
practical, concrete manifestations that makes them abstract 
background conditions to the legal-political order.126 Yet a 
 
 125. Id. at 122–24. 
 126. Interestingly, some liberal scholars’ answer for this worry is to call for 
more rather than fewer abstractions. For instance, Ackerman criticizes judicial 
rulings he disagrees with on account of their deployment of “selective 
abstractions.” Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 
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carte blanche cannot serve as a publicly recognized test for 
legitimacy.127 The Rawlsian conception of legitimacy that 
focuses on an abstract bill of rights is unsuccessful because 
it is over-inclusive. Citizens cannot be expected to consent to 
a carte blanche in their judgment to grant legitimacy to the 
regime under which they live. Such a conception is 
particularly over-inclusive from the Right side. This is 
because it lacks much of the theory’s egalitarianism given 
the exclusion of some principles of justice (namely, fair 
equality of opportunity and the difference principle) from the 
“constitutional essentials.” Consequently, the Rawlsian 
attempt to rectify the deficiency of the formality of rights 
fails. Therefore, this standard of legitimacy is potentially 
compatible with conservative and Right-wing institutional 
arrangements that exacerbate inequality and poverty in 
society.128 
Second, under-inclusion 
The “constitutional essentials” are under-inclusive from 
the Left side because progressives would demand the 
introduction of other essential items to the Rawlsian list. 
 
318, 321 (1992). Ackerman, thus, calls for a systematic approach to the Bill of 
Rights that deploys a “robust abstractionism.” Id. at 339. He asks judges to apply 
the “same level of abstraction” to rights and powers. Id. at 346. 
 127. Frank I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional 
Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS 63 (2000). 
 128. Famously, the leading neo-liberal theorist Friedrich Hayek declared, “the 
differences between us [i.e. Hayek and Rawls] seemed more verbal than 
substantial . . . we agree on what is to me the essential point.” FRIEDRICH A. 
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 2: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE xiii (1976). Hayek here is referring to Rawls’ approach of pure procedural 
justice. He explains that he has “no basic quarrel” with Rawls because they agree 
that background principles of justice apply to institutions and do not dictate 
distributive patterns. Thus, once the just institutions are in place the distributive 
outcomes are just. Id. at 100. See Andrew Lister, The “Mirage” of Social Justice: 
Hayek Against (and For) Rawls, 25 CRITICAL REV. 409 (2013) (arguing that there 
are “four main areas of Rawls-Hayek convergence: the importance of ‘pure 
procedural justice,’ the irrelevance of merit, the use of a veil of ignorance, and the 
principle that inequalities should benefit everyone,” and that their 
disagreements are primarily empirical/political rather than philosophical. Id. at 
411–12.) 
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Such additional items might include those principles and 
requirements of justice that Rawls himself proposes but 
declines to include in the essentials (given his judgment that 
they are less urgent and their violations are less 
transparent).129 Scholars have suggested different ways in 
which Rawls’ concerns can be alleviated. Understanding 
social and economic rights as “directive principles,” to which 
 
 129. For such an argument, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Race, Labor, and the 
Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643 (2004). Shiffrin 
argues that Rawls does not pay enough attention to questions of race and labor. 
For racial discrimination to be adequately addressed there is a need for an 
explicit, formal, anti-discrimination principle in the constitutional essentials. 
The benefit from such a principle cannot be convincingly addressed by the 
structures put in place by virtue of the two principles of justice, given the 
predominantly negative character of rights guaranteed by the constitutional 
essentials and because racism is not necessarily rooted in material sources. Nor 
can it be included in the first principle or the difference principle by sheer 
interpretive strategies. “Not all forms of discrimination have an impact upon the 
equal enjoyment of the formal basic liberties . . . . For example, racially-based 
employment discrimination [and] housing discrimination . . . . To put it 
concretely, it is unclear what specific provision of the two principles would 
directly condemn as unjust the treatment of Rosa Parks . . . .” Id. at 1647. In 
addition, such a principle would meet the Rawlsian criteria for constitutional 
essentials: its violation would be transparent—it would not require complex 
information—and it is urgent. Id. at 1660. As for labor, Shiffrin argues that fair 
equality of opportunity cannot be satisfied by the difference principle given the 
centrality of work to ways of life in ways that are not reducible to income and 
wealth. Id. at 1666–70. While such a principle might raise questions of complex 
nature, these would not be very different from challenges facing abstract and 
vague basic liberties. Id. at 1675. For a different view, see Tommie Shelby, Race 
and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1708–09 
(2004). Shelby claims that racial discrimination can be adequately addressed by 
Rawlsian theory as it stands without serious changes in the principles and their 
priority. It seems to me, however, that Shelby misses an important aspect of 
Shiffrin’s argument which is the focus on constitutional essentials that are part 
of the theory of legitimacy. This means that Shelby’s reply is inadequate because 
Shiffrin’s argument attempts to bring the fair equality of opportunity to the 
status of a constitutional essential against the backdrop of the absence of this 
principle from Rawlsian legitimacy. Thus, one can accept Shelby’s argument that 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity can address the effects of historical 
injustice on disadvantaged groups, id. at 1710–12, and yet accept Shiffrin’s 
position. If the principle indeed plays that role in the theory of justice then its 
exclusion from the constitutional essentials means that the political and legal 
system may not be able to address these issues of injustice (specifically given the 
fact of reasonable disagreement). In fact, it is for the purpose of playing such a 
role one would argue that it should be explicitly included in the essentials. 
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participants of Rawlsian public reason aspire to, rather than 
enforceable rights, might address the “transparency” 
objection.130 Furthermore, the “lesser urgency” objection is 
not necessarily an argument against inclusion in the 
essentials. Indeed, an explicit constitutional clause that 
prioritizes basic political and civil rights can meet this 
objection.131 According to these arguments, Rawls’ 
justifications for declining to include the rights entailed by 
the second principle of justice fail. 
Third, inadequacy 
It is unclear what kinds of deviations from the 
“constitutional essentials” should to be tolerated. Rawls 
never really specifies when the system would be “too unjust” 
or when the injustice of the outcomes would be so grave to 
render the universal reasonable and rational acceptability of 
the “constitutional essentials” immaterial and thus the 
regime will forfeit its legitimacy.132 This ambiguity is 
significant since it is relevant to the question of line-drawing 
between justice and legitimacy and the disagreement that 
reasonable people will have on this question. More 
importantly, when this ambiguity is coupled with the charge 
of under-inclusion from the Left and over-inclusion from the 
Right, it leads to an inadequate yardstick for legitimacy. 
Michelman argues that without the inclusion of socio-
economic guarantees in the form of directive principles, the 
constitution would be morally defective and cannot 
legitimate the exercise of political power.133 Likewise, 
 
 130. Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal 
Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13 passim (2003). 
 131. CÉCILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: GOVERNMENT 
AND THE DECENT LIFE 85 (2000). 
 132. For a similar point see Tommie Shelby, Justice, Deviance, and the Dark 
Ghetto, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 126, 145 (2007). 
 133. Michelman, supra note 127 passim; see also Frank I. Michelman, 
Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away, 6 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 663 (2008). In his later writings Rawls suggests that the difference 
principle be included in the constitution’s preamble as a non-judicially 
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Tommie Shelby suggests that the Rawlsian “constitutional 
essentials” are an inadequate measure for whether the 
political regime has exceeded the limits of “tolerable 
injustice” because “it does not ensure genuine conditions of 
reciprocity for the most disadvantaged in the scheme.”134 
Fourth, incoherence 
Constitutional rules that regulate politics are not only 
contentious but also contradictory. Rawls seeks to reconcile 
liberty and equality,135 and thus considers the fair value of 
political liberties a requirement for both justice and 
legitimacy. Accordingly, restrictions on campaign finance are 
necessary to prevent the translation of disparities in wealth 
into electoral influence that corrupts the political system. 
Rawls considers Supreme Court rulings that struck down 
attempts to restrict the influence of money on politics as a 
rejection of the fair value of political liberties.136 Another 
reading emerges, however, if one recognizes the possibility of 
conflict between values. The reasoning invoked by 
conservative judges to support corporate power would not 
violate the Rawlsian constraint of “public reason” so long as 
they primarily invoke “political” reasons rather than 
conceptions of the good in defense of their position. Indeed, 
these rulings may be seen alternatively as part of a struggle 
between two incompatible conceptions of freedom of speech: 
a libertarian that privileges liberty over equality, an 
 
enforceable principle. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 162. 
 134. Shelby, supra note 132, at 148–49. Rawls suggests that these are 
questions of individual reflection and decision. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 371–
82. 
 135. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 308; RAWLS, supra note 11, at 211; RAWLS, 
supra note 8, at 2; JOHN RAWLS, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in 
COLLECTED PAPERS 303, 305 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); RAWLS, supra note 17, 
at 326–27, 339, 369. 
 136. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 17, at 356–62 (criticizing Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976)). See also Ronald Dworkin, ‘The “Devastating” Decision’: An 
Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, passim (criticizing Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). 
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egalitarian that privileges equality over liberty.137 
This incoherence in the system of rights is a result of 
indeterminacy. The abstract notion of rights does not 
necessarily lead to a determinate result, nor does it 
necessarily preclude the arrival at any of these contradictory 
results. Rawlsian theory cannot immunize the scheme of 
liberties from this indeterminacy. It can be said that Rawls 
does not allow that one position is as good as another and 
provides a criterion for judgment in the face of conflicting 
positions with respect to the interpretations of the abstract 
principles of justice. This criterion requires the adjustment 
of basic liberties within a “fully adequate scheme of liberties” 
and orientates the liberties’ specification toward the theory’s 
egalitarian objectives.138 
However, abstraction is Janus-faced: the abstract nature 
of rights may be congenial to a thin conception of legitimacy 
but this very abstractness undermines the attempt to ascribe 
a determinate content to the interpretation and application 
of rights in concrete situations. Had this concrete content 
been inscribed in the “constitutional essentials” ab initio, 
then the theory would have lost its claim to proceduralism 
that allows the alleged convergence over legitimacy. The 
Rawlsian legitimate structure cannot dictate the Rawlsian 
interpretation of the legitimacy standards. If this were the 
case then his justice standards would be indistinguishable 
from his legitimacy standards. 
Thus, the inclusion of the fair value of political liberties 
in the “constitutional essentials” is not likely to secure an 
egalitarian political system because it does not rest on a 
coherent basis.139 This is especially the case when the 
 
 137. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 143, 144–45  (2010). 
 138. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 331–34. Elsewhere, Rawls writes: “No basic 
liberty is absolute, since they may conflict in particular cases, and their claims 
must be adjusted to fit into one coherent scheme of liberties.” RAWLS, supra note 
8, at 104. 
 139. But see Amy Gutman, Rawls on the Relationship Between Liberalism and 
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“difference principle”—whose role through progressive 
taxation is “to prevent accumulations of wealth that are . . . 
inimical to background justice, for example, the fair value of 
the political liberties and to fair equality of opportunity”—is 
lacking.140 
These kinds of controversies, that Rawls’ conception of 
legitimacy gives rise to, show that his conception fails to 
achieve what it was set to achieve: reducing disagreement 
about justice amongst the reasonable and narrowing the field 
of contestation by “fixing” some of the demands of justice as 
acceptable “essentials” that are allegedly less controversial 
than the other demands of justice. 
2. Is Dworkin’s Integrity Possible? 
Dworkin’s integrity faces similar difficulties. The 
reasonably just regime for Dworkin is that which endorses 
the ideal of integrity. Yet, Dworkin’s invocation of integrity 
is no less controversial than the disagreements over justice 
it tries to circumvent. 
To begin with, the background conditions that integrity 
presupposes are questionable and the results it seeks to 
derive from them are controversial. Dworkin’s integrity, and 
hence his notion of legitimacy, is possible if one accepts that 
there is an identifiable and shared coherent scheme of 
principles and that judges are able to work out law’s integrity 
by teasing out the fundamental commitments of the 
community and enacting its political morality. Dworkin 
introduces the notion of principles in reaction to the view of 
the law as a collection of rules, a view associated with 
positivist scholars. The law, according to Dworkin, is 
 
Democracy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 27, at 168 
passim. Gutman argues the criterion Rawlsian theory provides can help avoid 
indeterminacy. Id. at 183–84. Yet Gutman also cites debates concerning capital 
punishment, abortion, and pornography to argue that “reasonable disagreements 
over justice can also pose a distinctive problem for political liberalism” to the 
extent they may undermine the emergence of an overlapping consensus. Id. at 
184. 
 140. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 161. 
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suffused with moral principles and judges draw upon these 
principles to resolve disputes about what the law is that arise 
when there is a conflict between rules, an ambiguity of a rule, 
or a gap in the system of rules. For Dworkin, the law is a 
coherent whole and a gapless system. 
For this view of the law to be possible, the distinction 
between the domain of principled rights, from which judges 
draw, and unprincipled policy decisions, the domain of 
politicians and legislatures, should be workable. However, 
this distinction can be challenged either by showing that 
rights discourse includes policy considerations or that 
legislative processes include principles. On the one hand, 
Duncan Kennedy argues, judicial reasoning in the 
elaboration of abstract rights is not immune from ideological 
influences, nor sharply distinguishable from open-ended 
policy arguments (e.g., balancing tests in resolving disputes 
about rights).141 This suggests that the discourse of rights is 
not rationally coherent. While indeterminacy is not an 
inherent or necessary feature of rights, it may nevertheless 
be produced through the legal actor’s work.142 On the other 
hand, even if one could conceive of the court as a “forum of 
principle,” one may still believe that the legislature is a 
forum of principle too and thus deny the advantage ascribed 
to judges over politicians.143 
The difficulty in making a sharp and stable distinction 
between law and politics, adjudication and legislation, and 
judge and legislator is symptomatic of the incoherence of the 
 
 141. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SIÈCLE} 124–27, 
315–38 (1997). 
 142. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A Left/Phenomenological Alternative to the 
Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation, in LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED 
ESSAYS 153 passim (2008) [hereinafter KENNEDY, A Left/Phenomenological 
Alternative]; DUNCAN KENNEDY, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A 
Critical Phenomenology, in LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS, supra, at 11 
passim. 
 143. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 145–46 (1993); JEREMY 
WALDRON, Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 392, 419 
(1993). 
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background scheme of principles itself as it includes 
contradictory values. Abstract rights mediate between these 
contradictions.144 Kennedy argues that private law 
adjudication (as in contract law) exposes two conflicting 
orientations between altruism and individualism. The first 
favors substantive standards and the second favors formal 
rules. This conflict represents a contradiction (both internal 
to persons and between persons) between two “irreconcilable 
visions of humanity and society, and . . . aspirations for our 
common future.”145 These orientations exist in, and emanate 
from, the larger political culture. The “[l]egal form fails to 
screen out or significantly reduce the range of ideological 
conflict” in this culture.146 Rather, legal rules are “complex 
compromises” of such a conflict.147 This conflict “cannot be 
reduced to disagreement about how to apply some neutral 
calculus.”148 If private rights are an incoherent idea, it 
follows that public law that presupposes private rights is no 
less incoherent.149 Indeed, public law is no less suffused with 
contradictory visions of society.150 This is a contradiction 
rather than a competition or a tension between principles 
that may be resolved by higher principles because they 
 
 144. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. 
L. REV. 205, 259 (1979). 
 145. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976). 
 146. Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 229 (1986). 
 147. KENNEDY, A Left/Phenomenological Alternative, supra note 142, at 168. 
 148. Kennedy, supra note 145, at 1685. 
 149. Kennedy, supra note 144, at 360. 
 150. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 
IND. L.J. 145, 148, 177–78 (1978) (arguing “that the ‘public purpose’ and 
‘delegation’ doctrines, as judicially fashioned and applied, suggest the coexistence 
in the judicial mentality of two different, and contradictory, models of local-
government legitimacy . . . —an economic or ‘public choice’ model and a non-
economic ‘public interest’ or ‘community self-determination’ model”). 
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represent opposing ranking of values.151 
Against the backdrop of this incoherent framework, 
integrity neither guarantees “right answers,” nor necessarily 
constrains judges. Judges endorsing integrity can still 
advance their preferred values by representing policy 
decisions as rights and principles (for instance, judges 
valuing liberty will present restrictions on campaign finance 
as violating First Amendment freedom of speech rights of 
corporations). Other judges who privilege opposing values 
may comply with integrity while presenting different policy 
decisions as rights and principles (hence, judges valuing 
equality rather than liberty would deny that corporations 
have freedom of speech rights). Both sides can find some 
support for their positions in existing materials and 
precedents.152 Integrity then does not circumvent 
disagreement over justice (because judges disagree on what 
rights people have). Rather, integrity itself becomes a 
platform for such disagreement. 
In addition, disagreement might arise concerning the 
weight ascribed to integrity in its conflict with other ideals. 
Disagreement over justice, as Waldron points out, questions 
the Dworkinian talk about trade-offs between justice and 
integrity or justice and fairness. This is because there are 
different ways of weighing between justice and other values. 
These depend on one’s conception of justice. This conception 
might disagree with Dworkin that integrity or fairness are 
ideals equal in weight to justice. In other words, 
disagreements over justice breed disagreements over 
 
 151. Jeremy Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?, in EXPLORING 
LAW’S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 155 passim (Scott 
Hershovitz ed., 2006). See also Altman, supra note 146, at 235. Habermas’ 
attempt to defend Dworkin against the CLS critique has also been criticized by 
scholars as unsuccessful. JAMES L. MARSH, UNJUST LEGALITY: A CRITIQUE OF 
HABERMAS’S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 84–88 (2001). 
 152. KENNEDY, supra note 141, at 97–156. See also Altman, supra note 146, at 
223–31. 
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legitimacy.153 
Dworkin thus underestimates the intractability of 
disagreement because he denies value pluralism and 
idealizes the law in ways that marginalize the role of political 
disagreement and compromises in law.154 In practice, law is 
not necessarily coherent, and even if it were that might not 
be necessarily morally desirable. Whether one should prefer 
coherence to the morally desirable depends on the specific 
context.155 
B. The Procedural Republic 
It follows that the restrictions on the good and the just 
by legitimacy become wanting when one considers that 
legitimacy is itself highly contestable. If the justificatory 
moves, on which these restrictions are based, are a matter of 
reasonable disagreement, then the restrictions themselves 
lack the non-controversial basis (consensus amongst, and 
acceptability to, the reasonable) that makes them 
distinguishable from the controversial substance they seek 
to circumvent. 
The primacy of an impartial procedure as a foundational 
organizing governmental theme transforms the liberal state 
into, to use Michael Sandel’s phrase, a “procedural republic” 
that is not committed to any common good nor to a robust 
egalitarian justice.156 This procedural republic entails liberal 
constitutionalism in order to maintain its independence of 
specific ends while justifying the deployment of the law’s 
coercive power. Constitutional rules and principles cannot, 
however, control politics because they are no less 
 
 153. WALDRON, supra note 112, at 195–98. 
 154. Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 310, 315 
(1992). 
 155. Id. at 312. See generally Ken Kress, Why No Judge Should Be a 
Dworkinian Coherentist, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1999). 
 156. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4 (5th prtg. 1998). 
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contentious.157 As Seidman argues, constitutional law 
purports to consist of meta-rules that aim at evading political 
conflict. Yet it ends up reproducing the conflict at a higher 
level, the level of meta-rules themselves. One cannot justify 
such rules by referring to the same rules because that will be 
redundant; they cannot be justified through their 
consequences because this will be circular; nor can they be 
justified through a higher level of abstraction since this will 
merely lead to an infinite regress.158 
Therefore, limits on politics should be recognized as 
political and contingent.159 It is not convincing in this context 
to engage in question-begging definitional fiats of the 
political. Some scholars invoke an overly narrow conception 
of politics in order to represent constraints on politics as non-
political (e.g., technical or professional or bureaucratic).160 
Other scholars consider these constraints as political or 
ideological but in a trivial sense because they simultaneously 
argue that they are non-controversial and consensual.161 
Such empirically-oriented conceptions, however, treat 
existing limits on political debates as if they were simply 
“given facts” or “natural.” As such, they do not account for 
ideological contestation over, or normative justifiability of, 
the prevailing “consensus” or “common sense” in a specific 
time and place. Lacking a notion of historical change, they 
privilege the existing over the possible by presenting the 
contingent as stable. 
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Limits on politics neither emanate non-controversially 
from reason (or notions of reasonableness), nor can the 
domain of the “political” be limited beforehand. Habermas 
argues that Rawls’ theory, in contrast to his own “radical 
democracy,” is constrained by pre-political rights that are 
privileged over democracy and hence constrain democratic 
will-formation. Accordingly, Rawlsian political liberalism 
“merely promotes the nonviolent preservation of political 
stability.”162 However, this alleged difference between Rawls 
and Habermas is more perceived than real.163 As Larmore 
points out, Rawlsian and Habermasian theories are similarly 
based on a moral norm of respect from which an individual 
right to equal participation in the formation of collective will 
is derived. This norm precedes the process of collective will 
formation and does not originate in it. In other words, 
democracy presupposes pre-political rights in both 
theories.164 
C. On Neutrality 
In order to exemplify the political and contingent nature 
of constraints on politics this section examines liberal 
neutrality. There are two faces to neutrality: neutrality as a 
justification for political authority and neutrality as a 
restriction on governmental action. The point of what follows 
is to illustrate that this neutrality is either too abstract to be 
useful (egalitarian and progressive) or too concrete to be 
universally acceptable. Thus, neutrality does not provide a 
refuge from substantive and controversial judgments. 
1. Liberal Neutrality 
Liberalism is impartial towards competing conceptions 
 
 162. Jürgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: 
Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109, 128 (1995) 
(emphasis in original). 
 163. Larmore, supra note 58, at 617. 
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of the good, such as religions, but it is not morally neutral or 
skeptic.165 Liberalism is neutral towards the good but not vis-
à-vis the principles of justice.166 Liberal theory is neutral 
with respect to citizens’ choice between Islamic, Christian, 
and Jewish ways of life, but it is not neutral with respect to 
a political regime that is based on religion (as in a Christian, 
Islamic, or Jewish state). The latter is ruled out in liberal 
theory from the company of legitimate liberal democratic 
regimes. Unlike a communitarian or a perfectionist state, a 
neutral liberal state is “a state which does not justify its 
actions on the basis of the intrinsic superiority or inferiority 
of conceptions of the good life, and which does not 
deliberately attempt to influence people’s judgments of the 
value of these different conceptions.”167 
Furthermore, Rawls distinguishes between neutrality-
in-aim (the basic structure and public policy are not to be 
intended to favor any conception of the good) and neutrality-
of-effect (the state should refrain from any policies that 
might facilitate and encourage the adoption of a specific 
conception of the good).168 Rawlsian liberal theory requires 
the first only. The latter, he says, is impractical and is not 
required by liberal theory.169 State neutrality towards the 
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good does not mean that, in effect, some conceptions of the 
good would benefit more from the basic structure and will be 
able to recruit more adherents than others.170 Obviously, a 
majority will benefit more as it will be the dominant culture. 
So long as the state is not committed to the majority’s 
conception of the good and the basic structure and 
“constitutional essentials” are not tilted to serve it, Rawls 
would not complain.171 
Dworkin presents a similar position. On the one hand, 
political authority should be neutral towards citizens’ ways 
of life.172 On the other hand, such an approach would not be 
neutral in its impact on different ways of life.173 It is the very 
fact that there is no neutrality of effect that motivates Will 
Kymlicka’s project on defending group rights within 
liberalism. Kymlicka seeks to compensate disadvantaged 
groups to enable them to obtain genuine equality by allowing 
them to maintain their culture and to have access to the 
mainstream culture.174 
However, this recognition of the lack of neutrality-of-
effect does not go far enough. In fact, reasonable 
disagreement persists with respect to supposedly procedural 
notions like neutrality-in-aim.175 For example, it is equally 
plausible that state neutrality would require banning school 
prayers or its opposite outcome, that is, non-interference in 
the practice of school prayers. The dispute on the meta-level 
would seem to replicate the dispute on the concrete level: 
does neutrality require the imposition of outcomes of neutral 
democratic procedures or a minimal state allowing private 
 
 170. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 193–94. 
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choices?176 Ultimately, neutrality-in-aim is an incoherent 
proposition. 
2. Neutrality and Egalitarianism 
Neutrality’s contestability is illustrated by the fact that 
progressive liberal scholars have attempted to derive 
progressive institutional arrangements from neutrality 
itself. Thus, Ackerman claims that the demands of equality 
and distributive justice follow from the conversational 
constraints that neutrality imposes on the justification of the 
political order.177 This attempt to derive such a program for 
social transformation from thin and abstract grounds is far-
fetched.178 Fishkin notes that Ackerman vacillates between 
strict and loose conceptions of neutrality. The strict 
conception is too thin and empty to mandate Ackerman’s 
egalitarian objectives, and the loose conception allows 
substantive content but is indeterminate and thus fails to 
exclusively mandate the egalitarian objectives that 
Ackerman’s theory is set to establish.179 For Flathman, 
Ackerman’s neutrality would mandate the distributional 
goals to which he aspires only at the price of undermining 
his own primary assumption: the irreducible plurality of 
conceptions of the good. Since Ackerman’s “proposed 
allocations necessarily involve rankings of and choices 
among goods and hence among conceptions of good”180 the 
suggested “policies are grounded not in Neutrality among 
conceptions of good but in a preference for one conception of 
good over others.”181 But this conception is inevitably 
controversial. Only if it were unanimously accepted in 
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society would Ackerman’s proposals be consistent with 
neutrality.182 
Like Ackerman, Sunstein seeks to derive progressive 
conclusions from the abstract notion of neutrality. Sunstein 
objects to the conservatives’ conception of neutrality since it 
assumes the status quo as the natural baseline.183 
Accordingly, one might distinguish between an “activist 
neutrality”, that seeks to challenge the status quo and 
change it, and a “preservationist neutrality” that seeks to 
preserve the status quo and leave it intact.184 Neither of 
these kinds of neutrality, however, guarantees progressive 
results. Both can be marshaled on behalf of conservative 
agendas no less than progressive ones. This is because it 
depends on which status quo one wishes to preserve or 
challenge. The status quo itself is controversial. If 
progressives favor the status quo then they would 
presumably want to preserve it through “preservationist 
neutrality.” If conservatives dislike the status quo then they 
might adopt an “activist neutrality.” Even if both sides 
disliked the baseline that is embodied in the status quo, this 
would beg the controversial question concerning 
alternatives.185 One potential difficulty here is cherry 
picking. There are different aspects in the status quo and 
progressives or conservatives might like some and dislike 
others. Needless to say, progressives and conservatives are 
not monolithic camps (as the disagreement between Dworkin 
and Owen Fiss, Michelman, and Sunstein on pornography 
demonstrates186) and they would disagree on which aspects 
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of the status quo they dislike and if so which warrants state 
intervention. It would seem then that one would be 
alternating between different conceptions of neutrality 
depending on the context. “Preservationist neutrality” would 
be employed when one likes the status quo and therefore 
rejects state intervention as paternalistic. “Activist 
neutrality” would be employed when one welcomes state 
intervention to change the status quo but does not want to 
be charged with paternalism. 
Such an attempt to redefine neutrality does not expose 
conservative conceptions of neutrality as a mistake as much 
as expose neutrality as an essentially contested concept even 
within the progressive liberal camp given the different 
justifications deployed to justify it and the variety of 
conclusions that are derived from it.187 Sunstein considers 
“preservationist neutrality” a mistaken approach because he 
thinks it presupposes a status quo that violates liberal 
norms. That is, his neutrality presupposes substantive 
liberal values. As previously noted, liberalism may be 
neutral towards conceptions of the good but not with respect 
to the principles of justice.188 Thus, neutrality may not be 
neutral with respect to inequality because it demands 
equality. It is less clear, however, which conception it 
requires: formal or substantive equality; equality of 
opportunity or resources. 
Be it as it may, Sunstein’s later theory of constitutional 
legitimacy that is invoked in his theory of interpretation and 
his justification of judicial review (which he calls 
“minimalism”) does not necessarily guarantee progressive 
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results, as he himself points out.189 Rather than a robust 
approach of “activist neutrality,” he urges judges to avoid 
certain controversial issues and leave intractable questions 
“incompletely theorized.”190 
The outcome of these attempts, then, is to expose 
neutrality’s incoherence because it destabilizes and redraws 
anew the distinction between neutrality and paternalism. 
This redrawing, however, does not advance progressive 
politics since it is not necessarily mandated by conceptions of 
legitimacy deployed by progressive theorists and in fact this 
politics may be constrained by these conceptions of 
legitimacy. Worse still, arguments advanced by liberals to 
advance progressive agendas under neutrality may be used 
to advance conservative agendas if and when the particular 
context shifts. 
Some liberal scholars, like Schauer, are less troubled by 
the question of neutrality because they do not have a 
normative conception of legitimacy. Nor do they have a Lon 
Fuller-like or a Dworkin-like moral conception of the law. 
Rather they adopt a sociological conception of legitimacy and 
a positivistic understanding of the law. If the law is 
instrumental to achieving the community’s moral and 
political goals, says Schauer, then it is obviously not neutral. 
Principles are always partial with respect to something 
irrespective of the level of generality of their phrasing. The 
process of lawmaking and constitutional interpretation will 
always be value-laden and thus non-neutral. Whether one 
supports judicial review or not would depend on the actual 
consequences it produces and values it advances.191 
Nevertheless, Schauer’s position would reject the goals that 
proponents of “activist neutrality” attempt to advance since 
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these would be considered as an abandonment of long-term 
deontological values for the sake of short-term policies that 
are self-defeating over the long-term.192 
However, the problem is not merely factual (that the law 
is not neutral), but also normative (whether this lack of 
neutrality and its consequences are defensible). Justifying a 
legal regulation by sociological acceptance begs the question 
because the sociological fact itself needs a justification.193 
Justifying legal regulation by reference to pre-commitments 
is not compelling either, because these commitments are 
abstract and controversial.194 
Ultimately, questions like pornography or campaign 
finance reform or equal protection, Seidman and Tushnet 
remind us, are not about a choice between regulation and its 
absence. Rather, they require a choice between different 
regulatory regimes.195 Thus, it is misleading to frame the 
discussion in binary oppositions like “paternalism v. 
neutrality” or “intervention v. non-intervention” or “state 
action v. state inaction” or “positive liberty v. negative 
liberty.”196 That framing merely reproduces the question in a 
different trapping. The main issue is whether there is a 
publicly-available, universally-acceptable, theoretically-
principled, anti-paternalist position.197 Absent such as 
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position, the invocation of neutrality would obfuscate the 
real issues at hand because it would conceal the existence of 
paternalism despite its pervasiveness, including in private 
law (such as contracts, torts and consumer protection).198 
Perhaps, then, a more fruitful line of inquiry would be to 
decide which forms of intervention are normatively 
defensible.199 
III. THE DARK SIDE OF ABSTRACTION 
This final section argues that abstraction not only fails 
to lead to agreement, it is also likely to lead to undesirable 
consequences. In other words, abstraction is not merely 
futile; it is also misguided. This is because it mystifies 
political conflict and underestimates this conflict’s 
intractability, thereby leading to dire consequences for the 
prospects of realizing liberal justice. In its search for a 
consensual framework, political liberalism marginalizes the 
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question of institutional design and thus defers the 
advancement of that which progressive-liberal justice 
requires. 
A. The “Virtues of Abstraction” 
Rawls argues that abstraction is not merely a question 
of avoiding disagreement but it also provides a clarification 
device for the nature of disagreement. Rawls writes: 
The work of abstraction . . . is not gratuitous: not abstraction for 
abstraction’s sake. Rather, it is a way of continuing public 
discussion when shared understandings of lesser generality have 
broken down. We should be prepared to find that the deeper the 
conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to which we must ascend 
to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots.200 
However, the preceding discussion points to a different 
conclusion. It is not merely that abstraction as a 
disagreement-avoidance-minimization-postponement device 
fails. It also conceals the intractable nature of political 
disagreements.201 By presenting a state of affairs regarding 
the availability of “a common stock of concepts and norms 
which all may employ and to which all may appeal,”202 liberal 
political rhetoric falsely suggests that political 
disagreements can be rationally settled. This political 
rhetoric conceals the depth of value conflicts by presenting 
them as no more than conceptual confusions or interpretive 
mistakes and hence deceptive appearances.203 
The “higher the level of abstraction . . . we . . . ascend to” 
(to use Rawls’ phrase), the emptier the agreement it leads to. 
The emptier this agreement, the more illusory its nature, 
and the more incapable is this abstraction in providing us 
with a “clear view” of the “roots” of political and social 
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conflicts. Rather than discussing the “roots” of conflict, 
political discussions are diverted into an abstract debate. 
Neither the abstract debate is likely to be resolved, nor does 
it dictate specific resolutions to the concrete debates that are 
embedded in the specific social, political, and historical 
context. 
The method of abstraction abstracts the legitimacy of 
political and legal ordering from controversial conceptions of 
the good and reasonable disagreements about justice. Thus, 
it relegates much of the intractable, controversial issues to 
the non-political sphere. By doing so, it disconnects some of 
the political disagreements from their wellspring. Many of 
the political discussions become more technical or legalistic 
versions of the real issues lurking behind the views taken by 
the contestants. Indeed, abstraction may lead to highly-
specialized and obscure discussions.204 These discussions 
mystify the issues at hand.205 Disagreements might be 
misrepresented by participants or mistaken by observers to 
what they are not, or even disconnected entirely from the 
real issues at hand. 
Dworkin argues that abstraction is beneficial because it 
makes debates more civilized and less heated and increases 
the potential for their resolution.206 However, the point here 
is not whether intractable disagreement is heated or not, 
expressed in civilized ways or not. What is at stake is not the 
form of disagreement, rather, the main question at hand is 
the intractability and the persistence of this disagreement 
(with respect to legitimacy too). The method of abstraction 
presents a false picture of agreement over fundamental 
issues that regulate the political sphere. It represents 
legitimacy as a solid rock, an island of consensus, that is 
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acceptable to anyone who is reasonable and within which 
other disagreements can be managed and moderated. 
The history of moral and philosophical debates does not 
lend credence to the hope that abstract questions are likely 
to be more resolvable.207 These are no less intractable than 
the ethical questions that political liberalism seeks to set 
aside. One reason for the irresolvability of abstract moral 
questions is the absence of “consensus with regard to moral 
principles from which answers to contested moral questions 
might actually be derived.”208 
A possible objection to this argument may focus on the 
advantage of “narrowing the differences” as opposed to 
irresolvability. If there is a chance that a sizable fraction of 
the citizenry would find, say, Rawls’ principle of legitimacy 
acceptable and endorse it, would not that narrow down the 
differences amongst them? And hence would it not represent 
a moral or a practical gain that would justify the deployment 
of the method of abstraction? 
This objection conflates two meanings of abstraction: 
abstraction-as-common-ground and abstraction-as-
emptiness. Even if the common ground were achieved it 
would turn out to be an empty or incoherent common ground 
and as such it does not necessarily reduce disagreement. On 
the one hand, the answers provided to abstract questions do 
not necessarily dictate specific answers to the controversies 
arising in concrete contexts. On the other hand, moral, 
philosophical and legal discourses are indeterminate and can 
be deployed by holders of competing positions to justify their 
views in concrete cases.209 
Even if there were an effect of narrowing the differences 
this cannot confidently be attributed to normative 
endorsement as it may emanate from socialization and 
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sociological acceptance of authority. Moreover, narrowing 
the differences is a descriptive question that has a normative 
dimension. Disagreement exists also with respect to the 
desirability of narrowing the differences. And how will we 
narrow the differences between those who do not perceive 
narrowing the differences as a gain and those who do? 
B. Marginalizing Institutional Design 
Liberal scholars justify the gap between progressive 
liberal ambitions to justice and progressive liberal 
commitments to legitimacy (the proceduralization via 
abstraction) by virtue of the recognition of reasonable 
disagreement. This recognition leads to justifying specific 
notions of legitimacy and rationalizing certain institutional 
arrangements that fall short of what liberal justice requires. 
These notions of legitimacy remain controversial no matter 
how thinly conceived. Therefore, it is not only disagreement 
that is concealed but also politics is misconceived and 
watered down. This is because abstraction has also the effect 
of marginalizing the project of institutional design. 
Progressive liberalism cannot be evaluated without 
taking into account both its claims to justice and its 
commitments to legitimacy. William Connolly writes: 
Current liberalism cannot be defined merely through its 
commitment to freedom, rights, dissent, and justice. It must be 
understood, as well, through the institutional arrangements it 
endorses. Its unity grows out of the congruence between these ideals 
and their institutional supports. If the first principle of liberalism 
is liberty, the second is practicality. Liberal practicality involves the 
wish to support policies which appear attainable within the current 
order . . .210 
Indeed, the move to political liberalism, and even more so to 
legitimacy, includes some notion of practicality. Rawls 
writes: 
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[T]he aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, 
and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself 
not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as 
a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens 
viewed as free and equal persons.211 
However, the retreat to legitimacy that embodies this notion 
of practicality leaves political liberalism suspended between 
a reality it simultaneously condemns and accepts. Indeed, 
“principled liberalism is neither at home in the civilization of 
productivity nor prepared to challenge its hegemony.”212 It 
does not endorse the welfare capitalist economy (because it 
is unjust), yet it does not reject it either (because it is 
legitimate), nor does it insist on the required measures to 
overcome these unjust conditions. Indeed, “liberal 
egalitarianism’s institutional commitments have not kept 
pace with its theoretical commitments. This has led to a 
tension, perhaps even a crisis, in the politics of liberal 
egalitarianism.”213 
This crisis is likely to endure because liberal 
egalitarianism, for historical and theoretical reasons, cannot 
keep pace with its theoretical commitments. The recognition 
of the legitimacy of existing arrangements would make sense 
from the perspective of progressive liberal ideals of justice if 
these arrangements were likely to lead to the approximation 
of justice.214 That is, if liberal conceptions of legitimacy 
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provided members of society with the required resources and 
institutional prescriptions for advancing the legitimate 
towards the just. As far as one can draw lessons from the last 
decades of United States history, there is no progress 
towards liberal justice. The socio-political developments 
since, say, the writing of A Theory of Justice have been 
contrary to Rawls’ ambitions.215 The rise in conservative 
forces, including in the Supreme Court, have advanced neo-
liberal and anti-egalitarian policies that only increased social 
and economic inequalities.216 
In his recent work, economist Thomas Piketty illustrates 
that there is an overall historical tendency in capitalist 
societies toward increasing inequality in wealth and 
income.217 He stresses that the history of inequality is 
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“deeply political” and “is shaped by the way economic, social, 
and political actors view what is just and what is not, as well 
as by the relative power of those actors and the collective 
choices that result.”218 He maintains that the sustainability 
of “extreme inequality” depends not only on repressive 
methods but also on “the effectiveness of the apparatus of 
justification.”219 
It becomes pertinent then to examine how the “ought” 
can be realized in reality under such adverse conditions 
because ignoring them would be detrimental to the theory’s 
egalitarian objectives.220 Instead, liberal egalitarians have 
been either concerned with ideal theories of justice that 
lacked institutional prescriptions for their implementation, 
or that their institutional prescriptions (as a matter of 
justice) were too modest to achieve what their own ideals 
imply (given their focus on redistribution of income through 
tax and transfer schemes within the welfare state) and thus 
do not change the conditions that undermine the attainment 
of these very liberal ideals.221 Something similar can be said 
about Habermas’ attempt to tame the economy:222 “taming 
colonization [of the life-world] is insufficient if the inequality 
in wealth and income within the economic sphere is left 
untouched.”223 
The problem is not merely that liberal egalitarianism is 
either ideal or modest. Rather, the primary difficulty lies in 
the fact that the liberal theoretical edifice—no matter how 
ambitious as a matter of justice—maintains a gap between 
the “is” and the “ought.” In this move, justice recedes to a 
mere “ought,” a regulative idea, an external evaluative 
standard, a suspended ideal, or a delayed good, rather than 
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an immanent potentiality in existing forms of life that can be 
realized in the world. 
In fact, it is the very move to legitimacy that deflects 
liberal egalitarian attention from discussions over the 
required institutional changes, and from analyzing the 
historical conditions under which these changes can be 
realized. Consequently, the practicality that underpins the 
method of abstraction is self-defeating because abstraction is 
devoid of “practical utility.”224 Indeed, “[i]n the making of 
public policy, abstract theory is a good with very little cash 
value.”225 There is an evident tension between outlining an 
institutional program that a political regime committed to 
justice should pursue and thin conceptions of legitimacy that 
seek the widest acceptability possible. The thinner—the 
more “political,” the more abstract, and the more 
proceduralist—progressive liberalism becomes, the less it is 
able to secure or mandate its own ambitions to justice. The 
thinner it becomes, the more it privileges the existing over 
the possible. 
In light of this, the institutional commitments that 
follow from the endorsement of welfare-state capitalism or 
neo-liberalism as legitimate are more wanting. The problem 
with political liberalism is threefold. First, it is unclear how 
the move to legitimacy would bring progressive ideals to 
fruition given the thinness of the legitimacy standards. 
Second, abstract liberal legitimacy is malleable to anti-
egalitarian corruptions and neo-liberal manipulations. 
Third, progressive liberals accept these corruptions and 
manipulations as legitimate. Their own theories of liberal 
legitimacy have a legitimation effect on outcomes they 
oppose. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
At this historical juncture of fast-paced political, social, 
and legal change, this Article is an initial step toward a 
critical reflection on leading liberal frameworks that 
theoretically respond to the world of events and intervene in 
it. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to outline an 
alternative to political liberalism,226 it puts forth an internal 
critique of inherited frameworks. This is a crucial step 
toward exposing the need for alternatives given the 
increasing signs of atrophy in the existing social and political 
order. It may be satisfying to reconstruct liberal theories to 
defend more radical conclusions than their original authors 
would have allowed.227 It remains instructive, however, that 
these leading theorists were reticent in the first place as if 
obstructed by a straitjacket of their own making. By critically 
engaging the theoretical framework to which major liberal 
authors contribute, this Article probes whether this 
framework is adequate. Ignoring the instability and 
inadequacy of the framework, liberal egalitarians often 
reduce the question to one of disagreement about the means 
to address poverty and inequality, such as the justiciability 
of social and economic rights.228 Yet it is crucial to inquire 
whether the framework itself is deficient and thus should be 
transformed or transcended. 
Central to this liberal theoretical framework is a method 
of abstraction in which progressive liberals retreat from their 
initial egalitarian commitments to a more limited stipulation 
of the necessary background conditions for the deployment of 
the state’s coercive power under conditions of disagreement 
over justice. This method is untenable and its consequences 
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are normatively objectionable from a progressive (liberal 
egalitarian) standpoint. It neither secures an acceptable 
foundation for the legal-political order that escapes the 
disagreement that besets liberal justice, nor is it capable of 
securing its egalitarian ambitions. The question, then, is 
whether the thinning out process in the search for liberal 
legitimacy is a worthwhile progressive project. The legacy of 
political liberalism is that legitimacy is not only different 
from justice, but it also defers justice and legitimates 
injustice. 
Liberal legitimacy is different from liberal justice 
because it requires from the political community less than 
what justice requires. In fact, legitimacy presupposes the 
absence of justice and the inability to attain it, given 
reasonable disagreement. Liberal legitimacy is supposed to 
include some of the requirements of liberal justice (indeed, 
this inclusion makes it a normative conception of legitimacy 
that identifies a “reasonably just” political regime). Yet the 
existence of legitimacy is the testimony for the absence of 
justice because a gap between legitimacy and justice exists 
nonetheless. 
Liberal legitimacy defers liberal justice. First, its 
institutional commitments constrain the advancement of 
justice and in fact may hinder its attainment. Second, its 
abstract formulations cannot secure the requirements of 
justice. Indeed, liberal legitimacy cannot secure the 
conditions for its own existence (since reasonable 
disagreement concerning legitimacy itself persists), let alone 
for the existence of liberal justice. Finally, its abstract, 
procedural, “political” concepts have the effect of concealing 
the depth of disagreements in society and hence may 
preclude an understanding of the conditions required for 
achieving justice. 
Last but not least, liberal legitimacy legitimates the very 
injustice that liberal justice condemns. This is because 
political liberalism accepts as legitimate forms of political 
economy (e.g., welfare-state capitalism and neo-liberalism) 
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that contravene liberal egalitarianism. Despite the injustice 
that these political economies produce, political liberalism 
allows that they can be the product of acceptable procedures, 
acceptable institutions, and acceptable forms of reasoning 
that were envisaged by political liberalism itself. While 
political liberalism criticizes the injustice of these practices, 
its proponents have produced arguments and justifications 
that diminish the sense of urgency in tackling the gravely 
unjust conditions these political economies create. No matter 
how loudly political liberalism protests inequality, it has 
little grounds to object to the deployment of the state’s 
coercive power to advance anti-egalitarian policies. This is 
because it lends the unjust state the stamp of normative 
acceptability. 
